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Use the following to answer question: Figure 12.3 Use the following to answer question: Figure 12.3         -(Figure 12.3)  Which figure corresponds to the following normal-form game?   A)  panel a B)  panel b C)  panel c D)  panel d Use the following to answer question: Figure 12.3         -(Figure 12.3)  Which figure corresponds to the following normal-form game?   A)  panel a B)  panel b C)  panel c D)  panel d Use the following to answer question: Figure 12.3         -(Figure 12.3)  Which figure corresponds to the following normal-form game?   A)  panel a B)  panel b C)  panel c D)  panel d Use the following to answer question: Figure 12.3         -(Figure 12.3)  Which figure corresponds to the following normal-form game?   A)  panel a B)  panel b C)  panel c D)  panel d -(Figure 12.3) Which figure corresponds to the following normal-form game? Use the following to answer question: Figure 12.3         -(Figure 12.3)  Which figure corresponds to the following normal-form game?   A)  panel a B)  panel b C)  panel c D)  panel d


A) panel a
B) panel b
C) panel c
D) panel d

E) A) and B)
F) A) and D)

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Use the following to answer questions 26-28: Table 12.16 Use the following to answer questions 26-28: Table 12.16   -(Table 12.16)  The payoffs represent profits measured in thousands of dollars. In this infinitely repeated game, Firm A and Firm B are both using grim trigger strategies; they agree to charge a high price in period 1. If Firm A charges a high price for all periods, what is its expected payoff? Assume that d = 0.9. A)  $720,000 B)  $3 million C)  $364,000 D)  $200,000 -(Table 12.16) The payoffs represent profits measured in thousands of dollars. In this infinitely repeated game, Firm A and Firm B are both using grim trigger strategies; they agree to charge a high price in period 1. If Firm A charges a high price for all periods, what is its expected payoff? Assume that d = 0.9.


A) $720,000
B) $3 million
C) $364,000
D) $200,000

E) A) and B)
F) C) and D)

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Consider two players in the following game. Consider two players in the following game.   For what values of the discount rate would a grim trigger strategy ensure cooperation between the two players if they play forever? For what values of the discount rate would a grim trigger strategy ensure cooperation between the two players if they play forever?

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Both players are better off if they can ...

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Use the following to answer question: Table 12.4 Use the following to answer question: Table 12.4   -(Table 12.4)  Payoffs are profits in thousands of dollars. Which of the following statements is TRUE? A)  This game has no Nash equilibrium. B)  Horizon's dominant strategy is high price. C)  The Nash equilibrium occurs when both companies choose the low-price strategy. D)  There are two Nash equilibria, (80 , 80)  and (65 , 65) . -(Table 12.4) Payoffs are profits in thousands of dollars. Which of the following statements is TRUE?


A) This game has no Nash equilibrium.
B) Horizon's dominant strategy is high price.
C) The Nash equilibrium occurs when both companies choose the low-price strategy.
D) There are two Nash equilibria, (80 , 80) and (65 , 65) .

E) A) and D)
F) A) and C)

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Suppose that Ben and Tim are playing a finitely repeated flag game. The game starts with 7 flags in the ground, and the players take turns removing the flags. A player must remove either 1, 2, or 3 flags per turn. The player who takes the last flag out of the ground, whether it is by itself or in a group, wins the game. Assume that Ben decides first on how many flags to remove. How many flags should Ben remove on his first turn to guarantee that he will win the game? Use backward induction.


A) 1
B) 2
C) 3
D) either 1 or 2

E) B) and D)
F) B) and C)

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Which of the following statements is FALSE?


A) It is possible for one player to play a mixed strategy while another plays a pure strategy.
B) Some games have an infinite number of mixed-strategy equilibria.
C) In games with both pure and mixed Nash equilibria, it is best for players to play the pure strategies, not the mixed ones.
D) Mixed strategies entail assigning probabilities to the pure strategies available to a player.

E) A) and B)
F) A) and C)

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Use the following to answer question: Table 12.6 Use the following to answer question: Table 12.6   -(Table 12.6)  Payoffs represent profits in thousands. What is the Nash equilibrium? A)  (20 , 20)  B)  (17 , 17)  C)  (14 , 14)  D)  (19 , 10)  or (10 , 19) -(Table 12.6) Payoffs represent profits in thousands. What is the Nash equilibrium?


A) (20 , 20)
B) (17 , 17)
C) (14 , 14)
D) (19 , 10) or (10 , 19)

E) None of the above
F) C) and D)

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At one time, tobacco companies vigorously fought lawsuits by their current and former customers, even though the cost of defending the lawsuits exceeded the amount of money demanded by the smokers. What type of strategic behavior were tobacco companies using?


A) excess capacity
B) reputation
C) grim reaper
D) MAD

E) A) and B)
F) A) and C)

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Use the following to answer questions 19-20: Table 12.12 Use the following to answer questions 19-20: Table 12.12   -(Table 12.12)  The payoffs are profits in millions of dollars. If Firm 1 follows a maximin strategy, the outcome of this game is: A)  (20 , 20) . B)  (8 , 8) . C)  (-20 , 15) . D)  (-1 , 10) . -(Table 12.12) The payoffs are profits in millions of dollars. If Firm 1 follows a maximin strategy, the outcome of this game is:


A) (20 , 20) .
B) (8 , 8) .
C) (-20 , 15) .
D) (-1 , 10) .

E) B) and D)
F) A) and D)

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The lesson from Dr. Strangelove is that:


A) your enemies must know about your doomsday machine if it is to serve as a credible deterrent to attack.
B) to win at love you must sometimes make implausible promises to your lover.
C) prisoner's dilemma can be avoided by making side payments to your opponent.
D) forward induction is never superior to backward induction.

E) A) and B)
F) B) and C)

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Use the following to answer question: Table 12.32 Use the following to answer question: Table 12.32   -(Table 12.32) Two firms have formed an agreement to restrict output. They are playing an infinitely repeated game in which output decisions must be made every period. Both firms are using a grim trigger strategy. At what value of d (discount rate) would Firm A be indifferent about keeping the agreement or cheating on the agreement? -(Table 12.32) Two firms have formed an agreement to restrict output. They are playing an infinitely repeated game in which output decisions must be made every period. Both firms are using a grim trigger strategy. At what value of d (discount rate) would Firm A be indifferent about keeping the agreement or cheating on the agreement?

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The expected payoff ...

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Use the following to answer question: Table 12.8 Use the following to answer question: Table 12.8   -(Table 12.8)  Payoffs represent profits measured in thousands of dollars. Which of the following outcomes represent(s)  a Nash equilibrium?   A)  II and I B)  II C)  II and III D)  III and IV -(Table 12.8) Payoffs represent profits measured in thousands of dollars. Which of the following outcomes represent(s) a Nash equilibrium? Use the following to answer question: Table 12.8   -(Table 12.8)  Payoffs represent profits measured in thousands of dollars. Which of the following outcomes represent(s)  a Nash equilibrium?   A)  II and I B)  II C)  II and III D)  III and IV


A) II and I
B) II
C) II and III
D) III and IV

E) B) and C)
F) B) and D)

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Use the following to answer question: Figure 12.1 Use the following to answer question: Figure 12.1   -(Figure 12.1)  The Nash equilibrium of this game is: A)  Low , Up. B)  Low , Down. C)  High , Up. D)  High , Down. -(Figure 12.1) The Nash equilibrium of this game is:


A) Low , Up.
B) Low , Down.
C) High , Up.
D) High , Down.

E) A) and B)
F) A) and C)

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Big Earth and District 13 are two producers of neodymium, a rare earth. If they agree to restrict output, each firm earns $100 million per year. If both firms expand output, each firm earns $50 million per year. If one firm restricts output and the other firm expands output, the firm that expands output earns $150 million per year and the other firm earns only $30 million per year. Assume that Big Earth and District 13 will compete infinitely, with each firm following a grim trigger strategy. Which of the following statements is TRUE?


A) If d = 0.50, Big Earth is indifferent between agreeing to restrict output and expanding output.
B) If d = 0.40, Big Earth would be better off restricting output.
C) If d = 0.90, Big Earth is indifferent between agreeing to restrict output and expanding output.
D) If d = 0.75, Big Earth would be better off by expanding output.

E) All of the above
F) None of the above

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Use the following to answer question: Table 12.26 Use the following to answer question: Table 12.26   -(Table 12.26) payoffs are in thousands of dollars.  -(Table 12.26) payoffs are in thousands of dollars. Use the following to answer question: Table 12.26   -(Table 12.26) payoffs are in thousands of dollars.

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a. Fresh Fruit Market's dominant strateg...

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The following game: The following game:   A)  has no mixed-strategy equilibria. B)  has a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which Row plays Up with 0.5 probability and Down with 0.5 probability. C)  has a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which Column plays Left with 0.5 probability and Right with 0.5 probability. D)  has a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which answers B and C both hold.


A) has no mixed-strategy equilibria.
B) has a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which Row plays Up with 0.5 probability and Down with 0.5 probability.
C) has a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which Column plays Left with 0.5 probability and Right with 0.5 probability.
D) has a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which answers B and C both hold.

E) A) and C)
F) B) and C)

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Use the following to answer question: Table 12.10 Use the following to answer question: Table 12.10   -(Table 12.10)  The table shows the payoffs from the game rock-paper-scissors. Which of the following statements is (are)  TRUE?   A)  II and III B)  I and III C)  III D)  I and II -(Table 12.10) The table shows the payoffs from the game rock-paper-scissors. Which of the following statements is (are) TRUE? Use the following to answer question: Table 12.10   -(Table 12.10)  The table shows the payoffs from the game rock-paper-scissors. Which of the following statements is (are)  TRUE?   A)  II and III B)  I and III C)  III D)  I and II


A) II and III
B) I and III
C) III
D) I and II

E) A) and D)
F) A) and B)

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Use the following to answer question: Table 12.3 Use the following to answer question: Table 12.3   -(Table 12.3)  The payoffs represent profits. If Cape North and Imperial both choose their dominated strategy, Cape North will earn a profit of _____ and Imperial will earn a profit of _____. A)  $154; $154 B)  $120; $120 C)  $75; $180 D)  $75; $75 -(Table 12.3) The payoffs represent profits. If Cape North and Imperial both choose their dominated strategy, Cape North will earn a profit of _____ and Imperial will earn a profit of _____.


A) $154; $154
B) $120; $120
C) $75; $180
D) $75; $75

E) B) and C)
F) A) and D)

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Use the following to answer question: Table 12.30 Use the following to answer question: Table 12.30   -(Table 12.30)  -(Table 12.30) Use the following to answer question: Table 12.30   -(Table 12.30)

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a. Each player's dominant strategy is to...

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Consider two players with the following decision tree: Consider two players with the following decision tree:   What is the Nash equilibrium? What is the Nash equilibrium?

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The game can be solved using backward in...

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